Misrepresentation in Law

CHAPTER EIGHT dissimulation A mis histrionics is an untrue rumor, which induces the other party to scratch into the recoil. A magic trick may be pseudoulent, remiss mis education, or wholly innocent. The relevant remedy depends on the nature of the misre lay bulge outation. In order for a federal agency to amount to an sufficeionable mis means it must be a) morose b)one of fact as oppose to intention, persuasion, or truth c)The story must be inter turn over to the party who claims to throw away been misled )it must be the chief reason which bring forth the other party to enter the deoxidize. If the representation that is being challenged satisfies these four requirements, thence it is an actionable representation. Statement of item or Opinion A contestation which is made to the other party that is delusive and induces him to enter into the thin out, this is an actionable falsehood. The false tale must be one of fact and non of law because no one can misrepre sent the law since everyone is presumed to know the law.A affirmation of opinion is not actionable per se as a disproof because it is not a statement of fact. In Bisset v. Wilkinson, the respondent purchased from the appellant, two plots of attain in New Zealand for the purpose of sheep farming. During the negotiations, the appellant told the respondent that, if the place was worked properly, it would melt d birth two metre sheep. The respondent, it was admitted, bought the place believing that it would carry two thousand sheep.As both parties were aware, the appellant had not and, so far as appeared, no other psyche had at each age carried on sheep farming on the land. In an action for rescission for misrepresentation, Sim J. express In ordinary circumstances, any statement made by any owner who has been occupying his own farm, as to its carrying efficiency would be regarded as a statement of fact. This, however, is not such a case in these circumstances. The complaina nt were not justified in regarding anything said by the suspect as to the carrying capacity as being anything more than an expression of opinion on the type.Their skipperships concurred in their view on the matter, and therefore held that the purchaser had no redden off to pilfer the contract since an chimerical opinion stated by the party affirming the contract, though it has been relied upon and has induced the contract on the part of the party who seeks rescission, gives no title to relief unless fraud is established. The ratio decindendi of this finale is that the respondent had no previous or present knowledge of the capacity of the land, neither was he an expert in sheep farmingSo in the opinion of the Court the most he could have averred was a pure opinion. However, in certain circumstances, an opinion because it presupposes the possession of certain knowledge, may be an actionable misrepresentation. In Smith v Land and House home Corporation, the vendor of an hoteli er described it as let to a Mr. Frederick Fleck, a most desirable tenant. The tenant was in fact in arrears with his rent. It was held that the statement was not a mere expression of opinion because the vendor was impliedly stating that he has facts, which justifies his opinion.The court deemed the vendor to have knowledge of particular facts therefore the opinion was regarded as a misrepresentation of fact, which induced the other party to enter into the contract. The decision in Bissets case was adhereed in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon. Essos go throughd representative told Mardon that Esso estimated the through-put of petrol on a certain billet would reach 200,000 gallons in the ternary year of operation, and so persuaded Mardon to enter into a tenancy agreement in April 1963 for three years.Mardon did all that could be anticipate of him as tenant yet the site was not practiced abundant to achieve a through-put of more than 10,000 gallons. In July 1964 Mardon gave n otice to quit, barely Esso school principaled(p) him a peeled tenancy at a reduced rent. Mardon go along to lose money and by August 1966 was unable to bear for petrol supplied. Esso claimed possession of the site and the money due. Mardon claimed amends in respect of the representation alleging that it amounted to 1) a warranty, 2) a negligent misrepresentation. On the matter Lord Denning M. R. said that Council for Esso retaliated by citing Bisset v. Wilkinson where the derriere Council said that a statement by a New Zealand farmer that an acre of land would carry 2000 sheep was only an expression of opinion. He submitted that the forecast here of 200,000 gallons was an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact, and that it could not be interpreted as a warranty or promise. Lord Denning said that he would quite agree with Counsel for Esso that it was not a warranty in this sense that it did not guarantee that the through-put would be 200,000 gallons.But one party, Esso, has special knowledge and skill. It was the yardstick by which they measure the worth of a filling station. They knew the facts. They knew the traffic in the town, they knew the through-put of comparable stations. They had a great deal experience and expertise at their disposal. His Lordship went on to show that Esso was in a much better position than Mr. Mardon and their statement of opinion presupposes that they have knowledge to gage the opinion. This is very different to the circumstances in Bisset v.Wilkinson where the land had never been apply as a sheep farm and both parties were equally able to wreak an opinion as to its carrying capacity. The Court, therefore, found that Esso was liable for damages for get around of warranty. Fact and Intention Where a representation merely expresses the intention of one party, on a lower floor normal circumstances the intention, if it is not fulfilled, is not an actionable representation. However, in near circumstances an ex pression of intention may be considered a statement of fact. In Edgington v.Fitzmaurice, Bowen LJ said There must be a misstatement of an existent fact but the state of a mans mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. The facts in that case are The directors of a company invited a loan from the state-supported and stated that the money would be used to improve the companys building and to extend the business. The real intention of the directors was to use the money to pay off the companys vivacious debts. Their statement of intention was held to be a statement of fact. Can Silence Amount to Misrepresentation? primarily silence is not misrepresentation. Each man must protect his own interest and exercise reasonable caution when entering a contract Caveat emptor. However, the court may consider certain kinds of silence as misrepresentation. In With v OFlanagon the defendant wanted to sell his checkup fare. The negotiations began January 1 at which time the practice wa s worth ? 2000. 00 per year. However, the defendant knock atomic reactor ill and by May 1 when the contract of sale was signed, the practice was virtually worthless.It was held that the defendants silence in the situation amounted to a misrepresentation. Opportunity to Verify Representation Where the representee is given the fortune to verify the representation made to him, he may or may not induce use of the opportunity. If he chooses to act on the statements made by the representor and the statements whirl out to be false he can sue but if he chooses to verify and confirm a statement, which is in fact false, he cannot sue the representor. In Redgrave v. Herd, a man was induced to buy a solicitors practice by a misstatement of its value.He was given the opportunity to inspect the books, but he did not. If he had checked the books, he would have found that the practice was over-valued. However, the Court held that the non-use of this opportunity did not vitiate his claim. The P rivy Council in Senanayake v. Chenq followed this decision. However, when the representee carries out self-governing investigation to ascertain the accuracy of any statement made to him, though he did not find out the truth, he cannot claim to have been misled because then he would be relying on his own findings or that of his experts.In Atwood v. Small, a vendor offered to sell a tap and made exaggerated claims as to its capacity. The buyer appointed agents to investigate the mines. The agents inform wrongly that the claims were true. The contract of sale was then completed. It was held by the House of Lords that, the buyers subsequent action must fail because they have not relied on the vendors statement, but on their own independent investigations. Curtis v. Chemical Cleaners misrepresentation. Types of MisrepresentationFraudulent Misrepresentation. Fraud was defined by Lord Herschel in Derry v. Peek as meaning that the representation made is a false representation 1) Knowingl y or 2) Without belief in its truth or 3) Recklessly, careless whether it is true or false. Fraud must be purely proven and the burden of deduction is high It requires evidence of actual dishonesty. negligent Misrepresentation/misstatement. Liability in damages for negligent misrepresentation was created by the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v.Heller & Partner, if there is a special alliance and that the defendant was a skilled professional person acting in the course of his business upon whose advice it is reasonable for the plaintiff to rely. Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Ac, 1967, systematize this principle. The defendant can escape liability on the section if he can show that he had reasonable grounds for the belief and that he held those beliefs up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were true. The burden of proof is on the representor.See the judgment of Lord Denning in Esso Petroleum v. Mardon. Seeing that the S. 2 (1) supersedes the Hedley Byrnes case, it is doubtful whether this additional head of damages would add anything to the existing right(a)s to a lower place S. (1). Where a representation becomes a term of the contract, the plaintiff pull up s reduces sue for breach of a contractual term or breach of warranty, not for misrepresentation. Innocent Misrepresentation. Whittington v. Seale-Hayne Types of Remedies An actionable misrepresentation attracts the remedies of rescission and damages.Rescission, providing that none of the forbid to rescission are applicable, cancels the contract and restores the parties to the status quo ante. When rescission fails the innocent party go away be awarded damages which is a monetary compensation that will put him in the position he would have been in but for the misrepresentation of the representor with whom the innocent party had contracted. Rescission or Cancellation. The right to swipe is the right of a party to have the contract set diversion and to be resto red to his former position. The contract remains valid unless and until rustleed.Third parties may grow interest under the contract if the innocent party does not act with promptitude, providing that the innocent party is a bona fide(honest) purchaser for valuable consideration. In auto & Universal Finance v Caldwell, the defendant sold his car on January 12, 1960, to Norris who besidesk it away leaving a deposit of ? 10 and a checkout for ? 965. The handicap was dishonoured when the defendant presented it the following day. He immediately informed the police force and the Automobile Association of the fraudulent transaction.Norris subsequently sold the car to a tierce party who sold it to the plaintiff. The question the Court had to decide was whether the defendants conduct and representations on or about January 13 amounted to a rescission of the contract of sale. Lord Denning M. R. held that where a seller of goods had a right to avoid a contract for fraud, he sufficientl y exercised his election if, on discovering the fraud, he immediately took all possible steps to regain the goods, even though he could not find the purchaser or communicate with him, and the contract was bowl overed on January 13.If the innocent party delayed cancelling the contract, any third party who purchased the item bona fide would have acquired a good title to the property and the original owner had no claim to it. See the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v. Agnew. There are several bars to the right to rescind which may work against the innocent party to the contract. The bars are replication impossible, third-party rights, affirmation, lapse of time. These are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Restitution Impossible.When a party rescinds a contract, it must be possible for the Court to restore the two parties to the place quo ante, to put the parties back in their original position before the contract was made. However, this limitation should not be strictly construed, and the mere fact that the subject matter of the contract may have deteriorated before the truth is ascertained, is not sufficient to prevent restoration and so destroy the right to rescind a contract. * In Newbigging v. Adam, rescission was granted even though the league business was worse than worthless.The facts of that case were The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendants by which he was admitted as a partner with a manufacturing business and provided ? 10,000 of new capital. He was induced to enter into the agreement by a physical innocent misrepresentation as to the capacity of certain machinery. The business failed, and the plaintiff sued for rescission of the agreement for recovery of his capital, and for an indemnity against all claims which might be made against him by virtue of his being a partner.The Court unanimously agreed that he was entitled to the remedy for which he asked. Before the strait of the 1967 Misrepresentation Act, there was a further bar of rescission if the misrepresentation was innocent, there could be no rescission of a contract subsequently it has been executed. * Seddon v North East Salt Co. Ltd. The extent of this rule was somewhat uncertain and it was the subject of much discussion, for in many cases the falsity of the misrepresentation cannot be discovered until the contract is executed. However, the Privy Council in Senanayake v. Cheng did not follow the decision. By S. (2), except in the case of fraud, of the 1967 Misrepresentation Act, the Court has a discretion to allow rescission and to award damages in topographic point of rescission, and in this way could allow the contract to continue to subsists whether it was executed or not. The act has over rule Seddons case, Wilde v. Gibson. * Third-party Rights. As stated in a higher place a third party may acquire a good title if the owner of the property did not act speedily to rescind the contract, providing that the third-party has no kn owledge of the origin of the property and could not reasonably be expected to Car & Universal Finance v.Caldwell. A similar decision was made in Lewis v. Averay The plaintiff advertised his car for sale. A knave, be as the well-known television actor, Richard Greene, called on the plaintiff and offered to buy the car. The plaintiff accepted the order, and the rogue wrote out a cheque, signed it, R. A. Greene. The rogue wished to take away the car at once, but the plaintiff was not unstrained for him to have it until the cheque had been cleared. At the plaintiffs request the rogue produced identification that he was R.A Greene in the form of a special take in of admission to Pinewood Studios, bearing the name R. A. Greene and an address, a photograph of the rogue, and an official stamp. The plaintiff was satisfied on seeing this pass and allowed the rogue to have the car. The cheque was worthless and the rogue sold the car to the defendant, a music student, who bought is in good faith. The Court of Appeal held the plaintiff intended to contract with the person before him. The contract was merely voidable for fraud and the defendant, a third party, acquired a good title in the car against the plaintiff.Affirmation of the Contract. If after bonnie aware of the misrepresentation the party affirms the contract either by express words or by taking any benefit under the contract, e. g. accepting dividends on shares, or failure to remove his name from the depict of shareholders. In Long v. Lloyd the plaintiff was induced to purchase a dray by the defendants representation that it was in excellent curb. On the first journey after the sale, the dynamo broke and the plaintiff sight several other serious defects.The defendant was informed of these and offered to pay half(prenominal) the cost for the repairs. On the next long journey, the lorry broke down completely and the plaintiff realised that it was in a deplorable condition. He claimed to rescind the contra ct. The Court held that the second journey amounted to an affirmation and therefore the right to rescind was lost. Lapse of Time Under certain circumstances, lapse of time may be deemed to be affirmation, especially if the other party takes a considerably long time to rescind the agreement.However, normally, time does not extraction to run until the plaintiff becomes aware of the misrepresentation. In Leaf v. International Galleries, the plaintiff bought from the defendant a painting of Salisbury Cathedral which the defendant innocently represented to him at the time of the purchase to have been painted by Constable. Five years later, when he tried to sell it, he discovered that was not the case. He brought an action for the rescission of the sale. The Court of appeal held that it was too late to rescind the contract.Damages The remedy of damages, availability or otherwise depends on the nature of the misrepresentation committed fraudulent, innocent, or negligent. In Newbigging v. Adam damages were award for misrepresentation. In Whittington v. Seale-Hayne, the Court granted the plaintiff an indemnity against some of the lost which he suffered due to innocent misrepresentation. In Hussey v. Eels damages was assessed for negligent misstatement as to the non- existence of subsidence on the property which was the subject of the contract. - 1 . 1927 AC 177 2 . ibid at 180 3 . (1884) 28 Ch D 7 at 15 4 . supra at 191 5 . 1976 QB 801 6 . supra at 191 7 . ibid 8 . (1885) 2 Ch. D 459 9 . 1936 Ch. 575, 1936 1 All ER 727 Davies v. London and Provincial devil dog Insurance Co (1878) 8 Ch. D 469, judgment of Fry J. at 475 10 . (1881) 20 Ch. D 11 . 1965 3 All ER 296 12 . (1838) 6 C L & Fin 232 13 . (1889) 14 App. Cas 337 14 . 1964 AC 465, 1963 2 All ER 575, See interchangeable Life Citizens Assurance Co v.Evatt 1971 Ac 793, 1971 1 All ER 156 15 . 1976 QB 807, 1986 2 All ER 8 16 . in a higher place 218 17 . 1965 1 QB 525, 1964 1 All ER 290 18 . 1986 AC 367, 1979 1 All ER 883 19 . (1886) 34 Ch D 582 20 . 1905 1 Ch 326 22 . Supra 197 23 . (1848) 1 H L Cas 326 24 . Supra 195 25 . 1975 1QB 198, 1971 3 All ER 907 26 . 1958 2 All ER 402, 1958 1 WLK 753 27 . 1950 2 KB 86, 1957 1All ER 693 28 . Supra 196 29 . 1905 82 CT 49